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Abstract In daily life, emotional events are often discussed
with others. The influence of these social interactions on the
veracity of emotional memories has rarely been investigated.
The authors (Choi, Kensinger, & Rajaram Memory and
Cognition, 41, 403–415, 2013) previously demonstrated that
when the categorical relatedness of information is controlled,
emotional items are more accurately remembered than neutral
items. The present study examined whether emotion would
continue to improve the accuracy of memory when individ-
uals discussed the emotional and neutral events with others.
Two different paradigms involving social influences were
used to investigate this question and compare evidence. In
both paradigms, participants studied stimuli that were grouped
into conceptual categories of positive (e.g., celebration), neg-
ative (e.g., funeral), or neutral (e.g., astronomy) valence. After
a 48-hour delay, recognition memory was tested for studied
items and categorically related lures. In the first paradigm,
recognition accuracy was compared when memory was tested
individually or in a collaborative triad. In the second para-
digm, recognition accuracy was compared when a prior re-
trieval session had occurred individually or with a confederate
who supplied categorically related lures. In both of these par-
adigms, emotional stimuli were remembered more accurately
than were neutral stimuli, and this pattern was preserved when
social interaction occurred. In fact, in the first paradigm, there
was a trend for collaboration to increase the beneficial effect
of emotion on memory accuracy, and in the second paradigm,
emotional lures were significantly less susceptible to the
Bsocial contagion^ effect. Together, these results demonstrate
that emotional memories can be more accurate than nonemo-
tional ones even when events are discussed with others
(Experiment 1) and even when that discussion introduces mis-
information (Experiment 2).
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Individuals tend to feel confident in the durability and accu-
racy of emotional memories. The term Bflashbulb memory,^
coined by R. Brown and Kulik (1977), captures the picture-
like vividness that individuals often ascribe to their memories
of surprising and emotionally arousing events. Empirical data,
however, indicate that memories for emotional events are vul-
nerable to distortion: Individuals often change their reports
about how they first learned of an emotional event (e.g.,
Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire,
2000; Weaver, 1993), and nonpresented emotional items can
be falsely endorsed (e.g., Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001).
Although these studies demonstrate convincingly that emo-
tional memories are not immune to distortion, debates have
continued about whether emotional content influences the fre-
quency with which memory distortion occurs. Many studies
have reported higher rates of false recall and false recognition
of emotional items than of neutral ones (e.g., Brainerd, Stein,
Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Gallo, Foster, &
Johnson, 2009), although in the majority of these studies the
conceptual or thematic relatedness of the emotional items was
not matched to those of the neutral items (see Gallo et al.,
2009, for discussion). We have recently shown (Choi,
Kensinger, & Rajaram, 2013) that when this factor is equated
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across valences, by using categorized study lists, emotionally
arousing items are more accurately remembered than are neu-
tral items, and there is no tendency for emotion to enhance
false recognition. Palmer and Dodson (2009) reported a relat-
ed finding: When backward associative strength and word
frequency were equated across associate lists that differed in
valence, the positive or negative word lists resulted in lower
false recall rates than did the neutral words lists. Based on the
manipulations within that study (e.g., exclusion and inclusion
instructions), they interpreted these effects of emotion as stem-
ming both from the way information was encoded and also to
the way it was retrieved.
With few exceptions, prior studies examining the veracity
of emotional memories have tested individual participants,
without considering the role of social influence. Yet when
emotional events occur in daily life, social interactions are
likely to be a critical part of thememory rehearsal and retrieval
process. Although we might think to ourselves about mun-
dane experiences that have occurred, we tend to reminisce
and commiserate with one another about life’s highs and lows.
The overarching goal of the present study was to examine
whether emotionally arousing items would continue to be
more accurately remembered than would neutral ones when
discussion of the encoding event was encouraged, or con-
versely, whether this social interaction might remove or re-
verse the beneficial effects of emotion on memory accuracy.
It is critical to address this question in order to understand
whether the findings of laboratory studies of emotional mem-
ory accuracy—which typically test memory individually—
have implications for the accuracy of real-world emotional
events, when events are often rehearsed with others.
To date, only three published studies have examined how
collaboration can affect the retrieval of emotional information.
Yaron-Antar and Nachson (2006) assessed both individual
and collaborative memory for the assassination of Israel’s
Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin. Nominal group memory—that
is, the pooled responses from participants tested individual-
ly—consisted of more details (both accurate and inaccurate)
than did collaborative group memory, reflecting the collabo-
rative inhibition effect often seen on tests of recall (Basden,
Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997;
Wright & Klumpp, 2004). Wessel, Zandstra, Hengeveld, and
Moulds (2015) similarly demonstrated that individuals work-
ing as part of a triad remembered fewer correct, but also fewer
incorrect, details about an emotional film clip than did indi-
viduals working alone. Harris, Barnier, Sutton, and Keil
(2010) examined how collaborative discussion influenced
memories for the autobiographical context and emotion of
learning about the death of BThe Crocodile Hunter.^ They
found no effect of collaboration on the autobiographical de-
tails that people reported about where and when they had
learned the news, but they did find that collaboration distorted
people’s memories for their experienced emotions, reducing
the shock and overall emotion that participants remembered
feeling. None of these studies included a neutral control event;
thus, although all three demonstrate that collaborative retrieval
can affect emotional memory characteristics, they leave open
the question of how emotional memories fare relative to neu-
tral ones when social interactions occur during retrieval.
Moreover, these prior studies did not examine whether the
positive and negative emotional memories are differently in-
fluenced by collaboration. On the one hand, there is reason to
think that it may be the arousing nature of the stimuli that
would influence memory (reviewed by Hamann, 2001;
Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015) and thus that the effects of col-
laboration would be similar for positive or negative memories.
On the other hand, there is evidence that valence affects mem-
ory even when arousal is held constant; often, memory for
negative stimuli are associated with greater specificity and
reduced memory errors (reviewed by Kensinger, 2009), al-
though there have been some counterexamples where nega-
tive stimuli are more prone to false memories (Brainerd et al.,
2008; Porter, Taylor, & Ten Brinke, 2008). These findings
raise the possibility that collaboration could have different
effects on negative and positive memories.
To address these questions, we conducted two experiments,
each modeled off of a different paradigm that has been used to
examine the role of social interaction on nonemotional mem-
ory. This approach enabled a test of the robustness and gener-
alizability of social influence on emotional memory for posi-
tive and negative stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli. If
social influences affected memory for positive and negative
stimuli similarly, this would demonstrate an effect that gener-
alized across valences of stimuli and that would be attributable
more generally to the emotional features of the stimuli. By
contrast, if social influence differently impacted memories
for positive and negative stimuli, this would be attributable
to the valence of the memories (or to the emotional responses
tied to that valence), since the positive and negative stimuli
were selected to be of similarly high arousal. The first exper-
iment used a collaborative recognition paradigm, and the sec-
ond experiment used a social contagion paradigm. In brief,
past studies of collaborative retrieval have demonstrated that
when memory is tested by recognition, collaborative retrieval
tends to produce better memory accuracy relative to recogni-
tion memory accuracy for nominal groups (Clark, Hori,
Putnam, & Martin, 2000; Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007).
This enhanced accuracy can, in part, be attributed to Berror
pruning^ (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007; Ross, Spencer,
Blatz, & Restorick, 2008; Ross, Spencer, Linardatos, Lam, &
Perunovic, 2004; see Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010, for
review) during retrieval collaboration, where feedback from
group members can attenuate false memories and prevent in-
correct endorsement of lure items as having been studied. This
error pruning is likely to occur because not all members of the
group will share the same false memory; hearing from
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multiple members of a group that a lure item was not studied
may be sufficient to enable others to reject the item. In support
of this conclusion, studies that use unrelated lures, or categor-
ically related lures, in which the false memories would vary
from participant to participant, tend to result in error pruning
(e.g., Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007; Pereira-Pasarin &
Rajaram, 2011). By contrast, studies that use associative lists
that all converge on a single lure item (e.g., Deese–Roediger–
McDermott lists; Deese, 1959; Roediger &McDermott, 1995)
often lead to collaborative enhancement of false memories
(Basden, Reysen, & Basden, 2002), likely because the false
memory is shared among group members (see Rajaram &
Pereira-Pasarin, 2010, for discussion).
Such instances of increased false memories with retrieval col-
laboration highlight one of its insidious consequences. If a mem-
ber of the group is providing misinformation, this information
can erroneously become incorporated into other individuals’
memories. Roediger, Meade, and colleagues (Meade &
Roediger, 2002; Roediger,Meade, &Bergman, 2001) developed
a paradigm to reveal what they called the Bsocial contagion of
memory,^ whereby erroneous information supplied by a confed-
erate later is reported by a participant (see Gabbert, Memon, &
Allan, 2003, for a related Bmemory conformity^ paradigm).
Interestingly, this erroneous information, produced by the con-
federate, has been shown to be endorsed at a high rate by partic-
ipants even when they are given explicit warnings about social
influence just prior to retrieval (Meade & Roediger, 2002).
Together, these extreme findings demonstrate that there can
be both advantages and disadvantages to retrieval collabora-
tion. Some of these differences are related to the memory
reliability of the retrieval partners: When partners are moni-
toring for memory accuracy and are generally providing ac-
curate information, collaboration often benefits memory accu-
racy. But when partners are the source of misinformation,
memory errors can become inflated. The present study was
designed to investigate how the accuracy of emotional mem-
ories, relative to neutral ones, would fare under both these
conditions. It did so using the paradigm of Choi et al.
(2013), in which participants study categorized lists of posi-
tive, negative, and neutral stimuli and later are asked to dis-
criminate studied items from unstudied, categorically related
foils. When individuals are tested alone, this paradigm has led
to enhanced memory accuracy for the emotional items (Choi
et al., 2013). The present study examined how collaborative
retrieval would affect this pattern of results, both when the
collaborators were working toward a common goal of accu-
rate retrieval (Experiment 1) and when a confederate was in-
tentionally introducing misinformation (Experiment 2).
Together, using two thematically related paradigms, these ex-
periments address the question of how emotion and social
collaboration influence the occurrence of memory errors, thus
contributing to three intersecting fields of study: false memo-
ry, emotional memory, and social memory.
Experiment 1: Collaborative Retrieval
The first experiment used a retrieval collaboration method
adapted from Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin (2007), with the
task from Choi et al. (2013). This combination allowed for
the investigation of the effects of social collaboration onmem-
ory accuracy for emotional as compared to neutral informa-
tion. Critically, in this paradigm, the collaborators are working
together toward a common goal of accurate retrieval, and
participants are explicitly told that their individual responses
are of primary interest and do not need to conform to
the majority response.
Method
Participants Data from 48 participants are reported. All par-
ticipants were undergraduates (M = 19.6 years of age) at
Boston College. Twenty-four of these participants were
assigned to the individual test condition, and 24 were assigned
to the collaborative group test condition. All were prescreened
for history of psychiatric or neurological disorders and for
current depression or high anxiety. An additional 12 partici-
pants were tested, but their data are not reported here because
they either failed to return for the second session when mem-
ory testing occurred, were unable to form part of a collabora-
tive triad because one or more members of their group failed
to return, or, in the case of two groups, were assigned to an
incorrect study list due to experimenter error. Informed con-
sent was obtained in a manner approved by the Boston
College Institutional Review Board, and participants were
compensated either with course credit or at a rate of $10/hour.
Participants were scheduled in groups of four, and pseudo-
randomly assigned by the experimenter to either the
Bindividual^ or Bgroup^ test categories. Participants were
not told what test group they were assigned to until they
returned for the test phase of the study (see Procedure section).
Participants were assigned to a group together only if they did
not know one another.
Stimuli The stimuli and presentation scripts were those used
in Choi, et al. (2013). In brief, categorized lists of stimuli were
selected such that eight photo objects of categorically related
stimuli were selected for a total of 45 categories (15 of nega-
tive valence, 15 of positive valence, and 15 of neutral va-
lence). For instance, a negative category was funeral—with
casket, cemetery, hearse, etc., as category members—while a
positive category was wedding—with veil, flower girl, bride,
etc., as category members. Photo objects were selected from
those used in prior studies (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, &
Schacter, 2007; Waring & Kensinger, 2011) and all had been
normed for valence and arousal by at least 20 participants who
were sampled from the same Boston-area college student pop-
ulation that was sampled for the present study. All negative
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photo objects received average ratings that were lower than 4
on a valence scale of 1 to 9 (with 1 being the most negative)
and higher than 5 on an arousal scale of 1 to 9 (with 9 being
the highest arousal). All positive photo objects received aver-
age ratings that were higher than 5 on valence and higher than
5 on arousal. The negative and positive photo objects were
chosen so that the sets did not differ in arousal (p > .25) and
did significantly differ in valence (p < .001). All of the neutral
photo objects were rated between 3 and 6 on valence and
lower than 5 on arousal, so that they were significantly less
arousing than the positive or negative stimuli (p < .001) and
differed in valence from both of the emotion categories (p <
.01). The three valences of items (positive, negative, neutral)
did not differ in frequency, familiarity, or imageability of their
verbal referent (norms from the MRC database, all ps > .15).
The objects from the three valence categories also did not
differ in visual complexity (F < 1.5, p > .25), as determined
by normative data from 20 participants. The items also did not
differ in the numbers that included people, inanimate objects,
animals, or landscapes across valence and categories. This
matching was done by selecting the categories and photo ex-
emplars in triplicate (e.g., there were equivalent numbers of
images with people in the Bin a hospital^ [negative], Bin a
restaurant^ [positive], and Bin a school^ [neutral] categories).
Additional normative data are presented in Choi et al. (2013),
who used the same stimuli and task as the present study.
Based on this stimulus selection, a valence-specific effect
would be one that occurred for positive stimuli but not nega-
tive stimuli, or vice versa. A general emotion effect would be
one that was shared by positive and negative stimuli as com-
pared with neutral stimuli. Because the positive and negative
stimuli were selected to differ from neutral stimuli on both
valence and arousal dimensions, this effect of emotion could
be tied to the valence of the stimuli, the arousal of the stimuli,
or a related emotion-relevant dimension.
Procedure The task was divided into two phases: a study
phase and a recognition memory test phase. There was an
unsupervised 48-hour delay between study and test.
Study phase Participants studied the stimulus lists individu-
ally in a soundproof testing room. Participants were told that
they were going to view a series of slides containing a cate-
gory label at the top of the screen, with an image of an object
and the object’s verbal label underneath the category label.
They were told that they would have 4 seconds to decide
how appropriate an exemplar the item was for the category
heading—for example, if the category label was BAstronomy^
and the itemwas a picture of Jupiter and the word Jupiter, they
were to decide how well Jupiter fit in the category of
BAstronomy.^ Participants were instructed to make keyboard
ratings on a 1 to 5 scale, with the heuristic that a 1 represented
an average fit, a 3 represented a rather good fit, and a 5
represented an excellent fit. The scale was anchored so that a
response of 1 did not represent a bad fit because all items were
related to the category label. After a short practice, participants
studied a total of 225 items, five from each of the 45 categories
(15 positive, 15 negative, and 15 neutral).
The study phase was presented as an intentional learning
task: participants were told that after completing the study
task, they would later be tested on the items they were about
to rate. They were told that testing would either occur in iso-
lation, or in a group with two other participants, although
participants were not told the retrieval condition (individual,
group) to which they had been assigned. Participants were
given no further information about the test phase at this point.
Test phase Participants returned to the lab after 48 hours and
were given instructions for either the group or individual test,
based on what condition they had been assigned to after the
conclusion of the first session.
Group instructionsAll participants in the group had seen the
same study list during the study phase. Participants were
brought to a room and seated at a round table. Each participant
was given a Macintosh laptop with a blank Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet open. No other files or applications were accessi-
ble. Participants were seated such that no participant could see
any other participant’s screen. A fourth Bstimulus^ laptop was
positioned on the table to be equally visible to all participants.
Participants were told that the stimulus laptop would display
single words, one at a time, and participants were to deliberate
as a group as to whether the item was an Bold^ item—seen
during the previous study phase—or if it was a Bnew,^ unstud-
ied item. They were told to deliberate for as long as necessary
but were encouraged to keep the deliberation focused on the
current test item. They were told that they did not need to
reach a group consensus about whether the item was old or
new. They were instructed to press any key on the stimulus
laptop keyboard to advance to the next trial after everyone had
recorded their own response.
Participants recorded their responses to the recognition test
items in a blank Microsoft Excel spreadsheet on a separate
laptop. To ensure that responses were recorded for each item
and that participants would not lose their place, participants
were instructed to type the stimulus cue in the first column of
the spreadsheet, and record their Bold^ or Bnew^ response in
the adjacent column. They were told that each trial should be
recorded in a separate row of the spreadsheet.
Participants were presented with all 360 items: the 225
studied items and the remaining 135 items that were presented
as nonstudied Blure^ items. A single word appeared in the
center of the screen. No images or category labels were shown
during the test phase. Items that were studied or used as un-
studied lures were fully counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Items in both the study and test phases were
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presented in an order randomly generated by E-Prime at
the start of each test session.
Individual instructions Participants tested individually were
taken to a testing room containing a response laptop as de-
scribed above, and a stimulus laptop as described above.
Participants in the individual test condition were required to
record their responses on a separate laptop to hold testing
modality constant between the individual and group tests.
The individual test proceeded identically to the group test:
participants were told they could take as much time as needed
to arrive at their Bold^ or ^new^ judgment, and they recorded
their responses as described previously.
Data analysis Discrimination (d-prime) analyses were com-
puted according to Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), with two
extreme values (two false alarm rates of 0) adjusted, as in
Macmillan and Kaplan (1985). Using these d-prime values,
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the
between-subjects factor of participant condition (collabora-
tive, individual) and the within-subjects factor of item valence
(positive, negative, neutral). Additional ANOVAs examined
the effect of these factors on the hit and false alarm rates. All
analyses compare the data for the 24 participants tested indi-
vidually to the data for the 24 participants from the collabora-
tive triads who also provided individual recognition responses
to all items following a discussion; thus, 48 separate datasets
(one per participant) were included for all analyses.
Results
Discrimination (d-prime) ANOVA revealed a main effect of
valence, F(2, 45) = 10.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33. Discrimination
was better for positive (M = 2.61, SE = .11) and negative items
(M = 2.58, SE = .11) than for neutral items (M = 2.3, SE = .10).
There was a marginal effect of participant condition, F(1, 46)
= 2.76, p = .10, ηp
2 = .06, with better discrimination in the
collaborative (M = 2.66, SE = .14) compared to the individual
condition (M = 2.33, SE = .14). There also was a marginal
interaction between valence and condition, F(2, 45) = 2.66, p
=.08, ηp
2 = .11, with a larger effect of valence in the collabo-
rative condition relative to the individual condition.
Specifically, there was significantly better discrimination of
both positive (p = .002) and negative (p = .001) items as
compared to neutral items in the collaborative condition, and
marginally better discrimination of positive (p = .05) and neg-
ative (p = .13) items as compared to neutral items in the indi-
vidual condition (see Table 1).
Hit rate and false alarm rateA 2 (Participant Condition) × 3
(Valence) ANOVA conducted on the hit rates revealed a main
effect of valence, F(2, 45) = 8.30, p < .005, ηp
2 = .27, with
higher hit rates for positive (M = 0.86, SE = .01) and negative
(M = 0.87, SE = .01) compared to neutral (M = 0.83, SE = .02)
items. There was no effect of participant condition (F = 1.03),
and no interaction (F < 1.0). A similar 2 (Participant
Condition) × 3 (Valence) ANOVA conducted on the false
alarm rates revealed no main effects nor interaction (all Fs <
1.6, all ps > .21) (See Table 2).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 corroborated and extended those
of Choi and colleagues (2013) by demonstrating that when the
associative strength of items is controlled, emotion enhances
memory discriminability even when collaboration occurs dur-
ing retrieval. Although the overall collaborative memory ben-
efit seen here was perhaps weaker than in prior studies, the
effect of collaboration was in the same direction as prior stud-
ies using exactly this collaborative instruction (Rajaram &
Pereira-Pasarin, 2007), providing a benefit to memory dis-
criminability. One limitation of this collaborative design re-
lates to time-on-task differences for those assigned to the col-
laborative and individual conditions: Participants assigned to
the group retrieval condition were likely to spend more time
on each recognition trial than participants assigned to the in-
dividual condition. Importantly, while this difference could
explain overall benefits in memory, it would not explain the
effects of emotion. Thus, in Experiment 1, the beneficial ef-
fects of emotion remained when individuals collaborated at
retrieval, and the beneficial effects of collaboration existed
for emotional as well as neutral memories. For memory dis-
criminability, there also was a marginal interaction between
valence and group, whereby the emotional memory enhance-
ment (i.e., better memory for positive and negative stimuli
relative to neutral stimuli) was greater in the participants
who collaborated than in the participants who were tested
individually. It will be important for future research to assess
whether this interaction pattern will replicate, and whether it
could be strengthened under conditions that enhance the effect
of collaboration—such as if participants were required to
reach consensus about each item’s study history or if retrieval
were tested via recall rather than recognition.
In Experiment 1, it was unlikely that all participants in a
triad would share the same false memory. Thus, if one indi-
vidual endorsed a lure item, it is likely that other individuals in
the triad would counter that claim, indicating that a lure item
Table 1 Mean (SE) d-prime values as a function of valence and
participant condition in Experiment 1
Condition Valence
Positive Negative Neutral
Individual 2.43 (.16) 2.35 (.16) 2.22 (.14)
Collaborative 2.79 (.16) 2.82 (.16) 2.37 (.14)
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was not studied. Even though participants in the present ex-
periment were not required to reach a consensus as to whether
an item had been studied, this type of dispute may have en-
couraged participants to more carefully monitor the basis for
their memory decisions. Although emotion enhances memory
accuracy under these circumstances, this raises the question:
How will emotion affect memory accuracy when the partici-
pant is in a context in which a collaborator is a frequent source
of misinformation and there is no opportunity for adjudica-
tion? This was the question that Experiment 2 was designed to
answer.
Experiment 2: Social Contagion During Practice
The design of Experiment 2 was adapted from Roediger et al.
(2001), to examine what they termed Bthe social contagion of
memory.^ In brief, individual participants performed the same
encoding and recognition task as in Experiment 1. Prior to
completing the recognition task, half of the participants per-
formed a category-cued collaborative recall task with a con-
federate and the other half performed the recall task on their
own. The confederate introduced a number of lure items in
response to the category cues. The study was, therefore, de-
signed to investigate how this form of social interaction—
shown by Roediger and colleagues (Roediger et al., 2001;
Meade & Roediger, 2002) to increase the participants’ en-
dorsement of the confederate-supplied lure items—would af-
fect memory accuracy for emotional and neutral information.
Method
Participants Data are reported from 48 participants (20 men,
28 women), recruited by online ads and bulletin board ads
targeting undergraduate and graduate students in the greater
Boston area. Participants were 20 years of age on average
(range from 18 to 28). Due to experimental error, an additional
five participants were assigned to incorrect study lists, thereby
disrupting the counterbalancing assignment; their data are ex-
cluded from analysis. An additional six participants completed
the study phase but failed to return for the second session
when memory testing occurred. Of the 48 participants whose
data were analyzed, 24 were assigned to a social contagion
condition (11 men) and 24 to a control condition (nine men).
Stimuli The stimuli and presentation scripts were those used
in Choi et al. (2013) and were identical to those used in
Experiment 1.
Procedure The procedure was divided into three parts: an
encoding phase, a recall phase that took place either with a
confederate or alone (depending upon the participants’ condi-
tion), and a recognition phase.
Encoding phase The encoding phase exactly followed the
methods described in Choi and colleagues (2013), and the
methods were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Five items from each category were presented as study
items whereas three items were reserved to serve as
nonstudied items for the assessment of false memories.
Eight study lists counterbalanced across participants the cate-
gorized stimuli that were studied versus that were reserved as
lures on the recognition test. All participants were told that
their memory would be tested for the items, although they
were given no further information about the subsequent mem-
ory test.
Recall (practice) phase After an approximately 48-hour de-
lay (required to be between 46 and 50 hours), participants
returned to the laboratory. They were shown category labels
(e.g., Bfuneral^) and were asked to recall items from the list
(e.g., hearse, casket). Participants in the control condition per-
formed this task alone. Participants in the contagion condition
were told that they were going to work together with another
person, using a video call to be able to see and hear the other
person. Participants were familiar with the video call format,
and many of them spontaneously commented that they use
video calls to correspond with their family and friends in other
locations. Unbeknownst to the participant,1 this other person
was a confederate of the research team, who had been given a
specific set of words to supply for each category (The video





Positive Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral
Individual .85 (.02) .85 (.02) .82 (.02) .11 (.02) .13 (.02) .13 (.02)
Collaborative .87 (.02) .89 (.02) .84 (.02) .08 (.02) .09 (.02) .12 (.02)
1 During the debriefing procedure, participants were informed about the
presence of the confederate and were probed as to whether they had
surmised this role for the other person; no participant reported being
aware that their partner was a confederate.
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call format was used so that the confederate could consult a
master list that indicated which words she should recall for
each category.) The participant took turns recalling words with
the confederate (e.g., the participant would recall a word, then
the confederate, then the participant), alternating across trials
whether the participant or the confederate supplied the first
word. Across all categories, the confederate supplied 15 lures
of each valence and 15 hits of each valence. For any given
category, the number of lures supplied by the confederate
ranged from 0 to 2; this variability was intentional, to mini-
mize the likelihood that participants would become suspicious
of the confederate. The particular words supplied by the con-
federate varied across the eight study lists, but this breakdown
of lures and hits was constant across all lists.
After this recall phase, the participant was given a 30-
minute break. Participants were offered an opportunity to
briefly leave the laboratory to stretch their legs, and they per-
formed Sudoku puzzles during the remainder of the break.
Recognition phase Participants were instructed that they
would be working alone to complete a final memory test.
They were presented with individual words on the screen
and were asked to judge whether each word had been studied
during the encoding session two days earlier by making an
appropriate button press to indicate Bold^ or Bnew.^ This rec-
ognition test was self-paced.
Data analysis Discrimination (d-prime) analyses were com-
puted according to Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), with two
extreme values (a hit rate of 1 and a false alarm rate of 0)
adjusted as in Macmillan and Kaplan (1985). Using these d-
prime values, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conduct-
ed with the between-subjects factor of participant condition
(contagion, control) and the within-subjects factor of item va-
lence (positive, negative, neutral). Additional ANOVAs ex-
amined the effect of these factors on the hit and false alarm
rates. For participants in the contagion condition, we
additionally divided the lure items into those that had
been supplied by the confederate and those that had not
been supplied by the confederate and examined the in-
fluence of this factor on false endorsements.
Results
Discrimination (d-prime) ANOVA revealed a main effect of
valence on discrimination ability, F(2, 45) = 12.18, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .36, with better discrimination for positive (M = 1.4, SE
= .09) and negative items (M = 1.4, SE = .09) than for neutral
items (M = 1.2, SE = .08). There was no main effect of par-
ticipant condition and no interaction (both Fs < 1). Thus,
having interacted with the confederate did not reduce the over-
all ability to discriminate studied from nonstudied items in the
subsequent memory task (see Table 3 for all d-prime values).
Hits The ANOVA revealed a main effect of valence,
F(2, 45) = 4.49, p = .02, ηp
2 = 0.17, with better mem-
ory for negative words (.80) than for positive (.78) or
neutral (.77) words. There also was a main effect of
condition, F(1, 46) = 4.31, p = .04, ηp
2 = .09, with
higher hit rates in the contagion condition (.81) than in the
control condition (.75). There was no significant interaction
between valence and condition, F < 1, p = .51 (see
Table 3 for all hit rates).
False alarms The false alarm rates are reported in Table 4.
When the false alarm rate to all lures was analyzed, the
ANOVA revealed a main effect of valence, F(2, 45) = 11.26,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .33, with higher false alarm rates for neutral
lures (.35) than for positive (.29) or negative (.31) lures. There
was no effect of condition, F(1, 46) = 1.45, p = .23, and no
interaction, F < 1, p = .84. Thus, overall false alarm rates were
not inflated by the social contagion manipulation. However,
effects of the social contagion manipulation were revealed
when we compared the false alarm rates in the confederate
group and the control group on the subset of items that were
supplied by the confederate, or that would have been supplied
by the confederate had the control participant been in that
condition.2 This ANOVA showed a main effect of valence,
F(2, 45) = 6.22, p = .004, ηp
2 = .22, with higher false alarms to
neutral lures (.50) than to positive (.41) or negative (.43) lures.
There was a main effect of condition, F(1, 46) = 20.65, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .31, with participants in the confederate condition
having higher false alarm rates (.56) than those in the control
condition (.32). There was no interaction between valence and
condition, F(2, 45) = 2.15, p = .13, ηp
2 = .09.
2 When an ANOVA was conducted for the nonsupplied lures (and the
corresponding lures had the control participants been in the confederate
group), the analysis revealed a main effect of valence, F(2, 45) = 5.10, p =
.01, ηp
2 = .19, with higher false alarms to neutral lures (.27) than to
positive (.23) or negative (.25) lures. There was no effect of condition,
F(1, 46) = 2.06, p = .15, ηp
2 = .04. There was an interaction between
valence and condition, F(2, 45) = 3.48, p = .04, ηp
2 = .09, with a lower
false recognition rate for positive (p < .001) and negative (p = .04) items
compared to neutral items in the control group but not in the confederate
group (all ps > .5).
Table 3 Mean (SE) d-prime and Hit rates as a function of valence and
participant condition in Experiment 2
Group d-prime values
Positive Negative Neutral
Control 2.43 (.15) 2.35 (.14) 2.22 (.13)
Contagion 2.79 (.17) 2.82 (.17) 2.37 (.16)
Hit rates
Control .75 (.02) .77 (.02) .74 (.02)
Contagion .80 (.02) .82 (.02) .81 (.02)
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We also examined the effect of social contagion only with-
in the contagion group, comparing the false alarm rates for
lures supplied by the confederate and for lures not supplied
by the confederate. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of
valence, F(2, 22) = 6.04, p = .008, ηp
2 = .35, with higher false
alarm rates for neutral lures (.44) than for positive (.37) or
negative (.38) lures. This ANOVA also revealed an effect of
supplied items, F(1, 23) = 78.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .77, with
higher false alarm rates to the supplied lures (.56) than to the
nonsupplied lures (.23). Critically, these main effects were
qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 22) = 4.51, p =
.02, ηp
2 = .29: Although the effect of the supplied items was
strong for all valences (all ps < .001), neutral items showed a
larger effect (t = 9.95) than negative (t = 6.60) or positive items
(t = 5.66; see Fig. 1).
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed the insidious consequences of the
social contagion of memory, with very high endorsement of
lures that had been supplied by the confederate. The results
further demonstrate that emotional memories are not immune
to this type of influence; although the effect is lessened for
emotional lures, participants still endorse the emotional lures
supplied by the confederate at a high rate (over 50 % of the
time). Yet, even under these conditions, in which memory
distortion is rampant, emotional information is more accurate-
ly remembered than neutral information. These results are
reminiscent of those reported by C. Brown and Schaefer
(2010); using a social conformity paradigm, they demonstrat-
ed that postevent misinformation had a lesser influence on
recognition memory for emotional (positive or negative) pic-
tures than for neutral pictures. Together, these findings empha-
size that emotion can buffer against memory distortion, even
when that distortion is elicited via misinformation provided in
a social interaction.
General Discussion
Across both experiments, an emotional enhancement of memory
was present, with better discrimination of emotional targets and
lures as compared to neutral targets and lures. This beneficial
effect of emotion on memory existed both when social partners
were working together to achieve accurate memory decisions
(see Experiment 1) and when a social partner was the frequent
provider of misinformation (see Experiment 2). Next, we discuss
the relevance of these findings for the understanding of emotion-
al memory, social memory, and false memory.
Contributions to emotional memory
The results corroborate those of Choi and colleagues (2013),
demonstrating that when the associative strength of target and
lure items is comparable across valence categories, emotion
enhances memory discriminability. The present study provides
the first evidence that these beneficial effects of emotion can be
maintained when collaboration occurs during retrieval, and
when a practice partner has introduced misinformation. These
Table 4 Mean (SE) False Alarm rates as a function of valence and
participant condition in Experiment 2
Condition Valence
Positive Negative Neutral
Contagion supplied .53 (.05) .54 (.05) .66 (.04)
Contagion not supplied .22 (.03) .23 (.03) .23 (.03)
Contagion overall .32 (.03) .34 (.03) .37 (.03)
Control .26 (.03) .29 (.03) .33 (.03)
Fig. 1 For participants in the contagion group, lure words supplied by the confederate (black bars) were more likely to be falsely recalled than lure words
not supplied by the confederate (white bars), particularly if the lures were neutral
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findings suggest a resiliency of emotional memory to misinfor-
mation effects and suggest that emotion may aide in the accu-
rate retention of information in real-life contexts, in which emo-
tional events are often the topic of social discussion.
The results further confirm that emotional memories are
not immune to distortion (e.g., Pesta et al., 2001) while also
revealing that emotional memories can be less susceptible to
distortion across a range of social influences. Why might this
be? Some aspects of source memory are enhanced by emo-
tion, including the ability to remember whether something
was imagined or visually presented (Kensinger, O’Brien,
Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2008). In the social con-
tagion paradigm, it is possible that emotional items are some-
what protected from the misinformation provided because
participants are better at remembering which items were visu-
ally presented at study and which were supplied by the con-
federate. In both experiments, it is possible that participants
are more likely to invoke a distinctiveness heuristic (reviewed
by Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) when collaborators sup-
ply one of the lure items. Participants may disregard the ve-
racity of the collaborator’s memory for an emotional lure,
believing that they would have remembered the emotional
item had it been presented. These are suppositions; further
research will be needed to determine the mechanisms that lead
to the increased accuracy for emotional memories demonstrat-
ed in both experiments.
Interestingly, in the present study, the effects of emotion
extended to items of positive or negative valence. Because
these emotional items were intentionally chosen to be of
higher arousal than the neutral items, these effects cannot be
pinpointed as effects of valence or effects of arousal. That is,
the effects could either be tied to the emotional items being of
nonneutral valence or to the emotional items being of higher
arousal. The results clearly demonstrate that both positive and
negative emotion can enhance memory discriminability, and
this enhanced discriminability can remain strong even when
the emotional events are discussed with others.
It should be noted that in both experiments, the recognition
task was completed 48 hours after the study phase. Although
Choi et al. (2013) revealed beneficial effects of emotion on
memory accuracy after both a short (30-minute) and a longer
(48-hour) delay, the effects of emotion on memory can be-
come exaggerated over delays. Indeed, there has been much
recent discussion as to the reason for the shallower decay rate
for emotional as compared to neutral information (e.g.,
Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015), including the potential impor-
tance of sleep for the preservation of emotional information
(e.g., Bennion, Payne&Kensinger, 2015). Thus, the relatively
long delay length in the present study—although chosen pri-
marily for practical reasons (to avoid ceiling effects in mem-
ory and for convenience of scheduling the participants)—may
also have intensified our ability to uncover the beneficial ef-
fects of emotion on memory.
Contributions to social memory
A growing literature has demonstrated that social interactions
can lead individuals to be less likely to endorse nonstudied lures
(e.g., error pruning in collaborative retrieval; reviewed by
Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010) or to be more likely to en-
dorse nonstudied lures (e.g., social contagion effects; Roediger
et al., 2001). The present study demonstrates that this general
conclusion holds for emotional items as well as for neutral
items. Consistent with the patterns for neutral information, the
effects of social interaction on emotional memory accuracy
were in opposite directions in the two experiments. In
Experiment 1, when members of the collaborative triad were
unlikely to share the same false memory, and when they were
given an opportunity to discuss any discrepancies in memory,
the false alarm rates for emotional lures were numerically (3%–
4 %) lower in the collaborative retrieval condition as compared
to the individual retrieval condition. By contrast, in Experiment
2, when the confederate frequently suppliedmisinformation and
the paradigm did not enable the participant to confront the con-
federate about the veracity of this information, the false alarm
rates were approximately twice as high for emotional lures sup-
plied by the confederate in Experiment 2 as compared to control
items. Thus, as with memory for more mundane experiences,
whether social interaction helps or hurts the accuracy of emo-
tional memory depends on the memory accuracy of the retrieval
partner and whether there is an opportunity for adjudication
when disagreements in memory arise. Importantly, by including
both neutral and emotional items within the same study, the
present results also revealed that, as compared to memory for
neutral items, emotional memories are more accurate even
when social interactions encourage the endorsement of errone-
ous information. The social contagion effect was significantly
reduced by emotion—the effect for neutral items was one-third
more than the effect for emotional items—demonstrating that
participants may be less influenced by the reports of others
when retrieving details of past emotional events.
The results of the social contagion experiment further reveal
that interactions with a confederate do not influence overall
discrimination ability. Participants who interacted with a con-
federate did not differ from controls in their overall discrimina-
tion rates. Rather, interaction with the confederate led to an
increase in the endorsement of items that were supplied by the
confederate and to a decrease in endorsement of items that were
not supplied by the confederate. This latter finding is unexpect-
ed, and future research will be needed to determine its reliability
and to investigate its underlying mechanisms. We suggest two
possibilities. First, this effect may reflect part-set cuing, whereby
the generation of some lures by the confederate may make other
lures less accessible in memory, leading the nonsupplied lures to
seem less familiar when presented on the subsequent recogni-
tion test. Second, the contagion group has two potential sources
of errors: confederate-supplied lures and self-generated lures. It
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is possible that the confederate-supplied lures take a preferential
focus, leading to lower endorsement of self-generated lures than
is seen in the control participants, whose only source of errors
are these self-generated lures.
Contributions to false memory
The results clearly demonstrate that rates of falsememories can be
influenced by social collaboration, by emotion, and by the inter-
action of these factors. Moreover, the results of Experiment 2
reveal that specific false memories can be created via social inter-
action even when the overall ability to discriminate items is not
affected. The fact that those participants in Experiment 2 who
recalled items with a confederate later endorsed over half of the
nonstudied items supplied by the confederate—and double the
percentage of neutral items endorsed by participants in a control
condition—underscores the potential for social interactions to ro-
bustly affect the accuracy of memory reports. Together, these
results emphasize that to understand the veracity of memory, the
social and emotional context of thememoriesmust be considered.
Conclusions
In daily life, emotional events are often discussed with others.
The present study was the first to examine the effect of these
social interactions on the veracity of emotional memories as
compared to neutral ones. Across two very different collabo-
rative paradigms, emotional memories were more accurate
than neutral memories. These results reveal, for the first time,
that emotional events can be more accurately remembered
than neutral ones across a range of social retrieval contexts.
This result brings us one step closer to understanding the ve-
racity of emotional memories in real-world contexts, where
social rehearsal and reminiscing are likely to be key features.
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